

Can we shift weight away from activities that cause casualties?

- How where, do they occur?
- What activities are troops conducting when they are killed/wounded?
- What has caused increase in casualties in April/May?

→ HOW CAN WE WHAT DOING?

- What are the risks of going to a lower visibility posture now/6 MOS/2 MOS?
- Can our current strategy (IHL/PIC) transfers lead to lower casualties over time?
- Less troops = less casualties?
- explain tension between need to maintain LOC/deny IAF/collect intell/conduct com-kill ops COM ops / and reduced visibility

~~Can we shift weight away from activities that cause casualties?~~

- what posture changes can we develop that can

- 1) Help us with new government
- 2) show progress
- 3) save lives

Pages 2 through 17 redacted for the following reasons:

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Draft

Approved for Release

**SECRET// REL TO USA, MCFI //20160310**



# **Joint Campaign Plan 2006**

This briefing is classified

**SECRET**

REL TO USA, MCFI

Derived from: Multiple sources

DECL ON: 10 Mar 2016



SECRET// REL TO USA, MCFI //20160310



## Campaign Plan Issues

- post-tense interaction within about*
- Duration – 4 years with movement toward more normal security relationships after 2 years. *CF 06-07*

- Fundamental nature of the conflict – struggle for distribution of political and economic power among Iraqi ethnic and sectarian groups. SD – “fear of violence”

*→ “Big stake lose alot if doesn't work”*

- MISSION: The U.S. Mission and Coalition Forces will, in partnership with the Government of Iraq, contribute to an environment where Iraqis can develop representative and effective institutions capable of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people, creating the conditions for the Rule of Law, defeating the insurgency and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror.

- Appearance of military lead in Joint Campaign Plan.

- Don't get locked in – prepare for some discontinuity.



SECRET// REL TO USA, MCFI //20160310



## Mission Statements

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### August 2004 Campaign Plan

In partnership with the Iraqi Government, MNF-I conducts full spectrum counter-insurgency operations to isolate and neutralize former regime extremists and foreign terrorists, and organizes, trains and equips Iraqi Security Forces in order to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process on schedule.

### April 2005 Campaign Action Plan

In partnership with the Iraqi Transitional Government, MNF-I progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and Iraqi Security Forces, while aggressively executing counterinsurgency operations to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process and the sustainment of political and economic development.

### Draft March 2006 Joint Campaign Plan

The U.S. Mission and Coalition Forces will, in partnership with the Government of Iraq, contribute to an environment where Iraqis can develop representative and effective institutions capable of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people, creating the conditions for the Rule of Law, defeating the insurgency and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror.

SECRET//REL MCFI



# *MNF Iraq Update*

22 March 2006

This briefing is classified

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Derived from: Multiple sources

DECL ON: X1



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## Al Anbar Update

- Anbarites are tired of violence. "Wedge" between Al Qaida (AQIZ) and Sunni resistance groups exists, but it is not expanding.
- AQIZ has used intimidation and assassinations to maintain a presence and keep "wedge" from expanding especially in Ramadi.
- AQIZ persistently trying to re-establish itself throughout WERV.
- Anbar Consolidation Program *600 MIN*
  - Police: 8000 recruited, trained and equipped by end of year. *MOVING UP*
  - Army: 6500 recruited, trained and equipped by October.
  - Reconstruction: \$75M in projects from GOI being executed. *400 PROJECTS*
- Military operations continue to disrupt and pressure AQIZ network.

*8 MAR - 74 TBTS*

*Ramadi - Baghdad*

*40+ AMZ*

*7 Key leaders in  
last 2 mos*

*240  
115  
175*

*14 JILL CANAL*


NSC 22 March 2006

Itizam Mushtarak - United Commitment

SECRET//REL MCFI



# Al Anbar Reconstruction Program





# ***Year of the Police Update***

**70% (130K/200K) of the Iraqi Objective Civil Security Forces are trained and equipped as of 15 Mar 2006. We are on schedule to be completed with equipping and initial training by end Dec 2006.**

**Iraqi Police Services:** 70% of all Iraqi Police Services are trained and equipped. On 30 Mar 2006 we will graduate Iraq's first Iraqi policeman-to-officer transition course (278 graduates).

**National Police:** 80% of the National Police force is trained and equipped. 13 officers and 75 non-commissioned officers began Iraq's first National Police officer and non-commissioned officer courses in February 06.

**Department of Border Enforcement:** 70% of Border Police forces are trained and equipped. Border Police and Port of Entry training will be complete by May 2006. 85% of Border forces will be equipped by June and 100% by December 2006. 80% (216/258) of border fort construction is completed. 100% will be completed by July 2006.

**80% (741/981) of our police academy instructors are now Iraqi. We expect to transfer operation of all 12 Iraqi police academies to the Iraqis by end 2006.**

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## Commander's Update

- Ethnic/sectarian violence decreasing in Baghdad area, but still above previous norms. *- last week 19/DAY vs 11/DAY month before 22 FEB*  
*- as high as 33/DAY in day after SAHA CITY BOMBING - 10 days ago*  
*↳ drop since 22 Feb > 40*
- Seating of Council of Representatives and Arba'een marches and gatherings took place with no major security problems. *2.5 million came leaving Karbala - walking 16M*  
*↳ Killed 25/100000*  
*↳ 100 OUT OF WOODS*  
*part of Ciba*
- Operation "Scales of Justice" positively impacting Baghdad security situation. *+ 8 BAS SIG 345 INCL 1 CFF - > doubled patrols and*  
*5 DISPRICES*  
*2000 POLICE*  
*END ANMC*  
*65% of patrols & 100% of T&P are 100% on combat*
- Operation "Swarm" wrapping up. Accomplished objective of disrupting potential AQIZ sanctuary. *DISRUPT AQIZ*  
*SAHARA*  
*118 detainees - 96 held*  
*24 Cache*  
*APAS/MAS*  
*ADT work with ANTS/DSS/LADSS*  
*1/13 PRT*  
*77 WASH*  
*TERMINIST TALK*  
*CAMERA of USKE*
- Al Anbar Update.



# Operation Swarmer Accomplishments

- ④ • Visible demonstration of ISF proficiency ✓
  - Increase population's confidence in ISF
  - Increase local government's confidence in ISF
  - Based in large part on ISF generated [1.4c]
- Deterred IED Cells and a possible MANPADS Cell
  - 24 large cache's yielded significant amount of munitions and IED making material
- Disrupted AIF and localized AQIZ facilitators
  - Confirmed thru sensitive [1.4c] reporting
  - DOCEX and interrogation of detainees (71) continuing
- ② • Apparent and immediate positive change in attitude of Samarra population
  - People willing to discuss projects and improvements in the city
  - IPs reporting to duty has quadrupled
  - IPs are taking action -- doing their job
- ① • AQIZ / AIF Cells disrupted
  - [1.4c] indicate movement to other parts of the AOR
  - Disruption provides ability to gather targetable intelligence for follow-on, focused Counter-terrorist operations by CF.

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# Strategic Assessment of Civil War In Iraq

22 March 2006

This briefing is classified

**SECRET**

REL MCFI

Derived from: Multiple sources

DECL ON: X1

Civil War in Iraq  
(22 March 2006)

**Itizam Mushtarak - United Commitment**

**SECRET//REL MCFI**



SECRET//REL MCFI



## Bottom Line Up Front

- Civil War in Iraq – as defined by this brief – is not imminent nor inevitable.
- Civil War in Iraq would be so disruptive to our ability to accomplish our strategic objectives we should do everything in our power to avoid it.

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## Context

- Should think about current situation in context of last three years.
  - Iraqis on threshold of self-government.
  - Less than 2 years from our goal of establishing Iraqi Security Forces.
- Resilience and long – suffering of Iraqi people still present but strained.
- Protracted Civil War would put accomplishing of our strategic objectives off indefinitely – AQIZ, SADDAMISTS, 1.4b big winners.




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## What Would Civil War Look Like?

- Widespread, intense and sustained fighting between ethnic/sectarian groups accompanied by the failure of central government control
- Would result from the failure of Iraqi Security Forces and the political process
- A battle between Sunni insurgents and Shia militia supported by regional actors
- Focused on mixed population in "Baghdad-belt" (Baghdad, Diyala, Babil, Southern Saladin); not a country-wide phenomenon
  - Kurds largely sit out the conflict; Shia would attempt to consolidate power in southern Iraq
- AQI support to Sunni insurgents would lead to establishment of terrorist safe haven
- Likely sequence: sectarian cleansing; consolidation of key ethnic and sectarian regions; stalemate (neither side capable of sustained offensive action without external support)







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## Key Judgments

- Iraq has not crossed into civil war. It is neither imminent nor inevitable.
- Some conditions for civil war do exist (hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, heightened levels of sectarian violence, existence of centers of authority outside the government).
- Controlling influence of prominent Shia leadership is the key to stability.
- Iraq cannot be "pushed" into civil war as long as CF remain in large numbers, ISF remains a national force, and ethnic groups support the political process.

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## What Should We Do?

- Do everything in our power to prevent civil war in Iraq.
- Key actions:
  - Encourage Iraqi political and religious leaders to form the government as expeditiously as possible.
  - Encourage Iraqi political and religious leaders to exercise patience and control.
  - Continue to play a leading role in shaping security responses and holding the ISF together.
  - Continue counter-terrorism operations to defeat AQIZ.
  - Encourage and support GOI efforts to prevent additional sectarian attacks and prepare an emergency action plan to mitigate consequences of future high-visibility attack.
  - Press GOI to take actions to defuse militia influence, particularly in Baghdad area.
  - Build public confidence in government and security forces.

□ *Leaders in new govt*



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## What If It Happens?

- COA1: Coalition Forces withdraw from Iraq
- COA2: Coalition Forces assume a defensive, force protection posture and allow civil war to culminate
- COA3: Coalition Forces intervene to stop the civil war
- COA4: Coalition Forces align with one or more groups and pursue aggressive offensive operations against the opposition

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## ***Back-up Slides***

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## Indicators

Indicator	Trend	Reporting Over Past: 24 Hours/ Week
Hardening of ethno-sectarian identities/ Division among groups	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Mol Headquarters officers allegedly reassigned to remote locations based on sectarian affiliation</li> <li>■ Jihadist web postings threatening revenge against Shi'a communities</li> <li>■ 3 VBIEDs targeting civilians last 48 hours, 5 KIA (one Imam killed)</li> </ul>
Change in character of violence	↑	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Reports of dead bodies found decreased in last 24 hours</li> <li>■ Most recent SVBIEDs targeted CF/ISF rather than civilians</li> <li>■ Reports of JAM mass killing Sunnis in Sadr City</li> <li>■ Increasing attempts to assassinate senior Sunni leaders</li> </ul>
Ethno-sectarian mobilization	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Recent Sadr statements blame US/UK for recent sectarian violence</li> <li>■ JAM stockpiling weapons in Baghdad and south</li> <li>■ Multiple reports of Sunni leaders calling for militias to provide security</li> </ul>
Population movements	↑	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ NGO reporting: (not substantiated by Corps) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ OMS accommodating some IDPs in public buildings, while most stay with other families in local community</li> <li>■ Iraqi Islamic Party preparing to establish tent city at mosque in W Baghdad</li> <li>■ Several reports of attacks driving hundreds of Shi'a families out of Nahrwan due to threats from Sunnis</li> <li>■ More than 800 families displaced to Baghdad</li> <li>■ More than 500 families displaced to Najaf</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

**Assessment:** No indications of slide into civil war. No significant changes to any indicators over the past 24 hours. IDP movements into Baghdad are small-scale relocations and likely temporary.

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# ANBAR CONSOLIDATION BRIEF

MNF-I VTC

22 MAR 06

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Deng Anbar  
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run pop  
Defeat Anbar



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# Agenda

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- Introduction
- Intel Update
- Governance and Economics
- Corps Comments
- MNF-W Comments
- Iraqi Army, Police & Border Forces
- Al Anbar Operational Assessment
- CG's Comments

MNF-I STRATOPS

MNF-I, C2

MNF-I STRATEFF

MNC-I

MNF-W

MNSTC-I

TF 1.4a

CG

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# **MNF-I Intel Update**

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## ***Al Anbar Province: AQI-Sunni Tensions***

Mid-March 06 reporting indicates “wedge” between AQI and Sunni groups remains in al Anbar Province, but is not expanding

Despite anti-AQI sentiment, AQI intimidation activities undermine local resistance

AQI presence and operational capability growing in Ramadi

Reduction of support to AQI direct result of AQI's:

- Threat to Sunni tribal authority
- Threat to Sunni Rejectionists / other T&FF group influence
- Intimidation and threats to local stability



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## Al Anbar Province: Indicators of AQI Strength

Activity	Trend	Recent Reporting
Sunni support for AQI	↓	<p>Sunni support for AQI waning, upset with AQI tactics and intimidation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>44 Anbar Sheikhs met to discuss AQI problem in Jubba, Baghdadi</li> <li>Haditha Imam orders AQI to remove IEDs from mosque property, locals protest AQI posting propaganda</li> </ul>
AQI intimidation	↑	<p>AQI continues focused assassination and extortion campaign</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>People's Comm/Gov. Council/Albu Mahal members killed 16-20 March</li> <li>AQI intimidating students, faculty at al Anbar university</li> <li>AQI fighters force Sunni citizens out of their homes in Ramadi</li> </ul>
Permissive Environment	↔	<p>AQI fighters face reprisal violence, remain prevalent in al Anbar</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Public perceives AQI operates freely in Ramadi and surrounding areas</li> <li>Anbar Revenge Bde claim killing AQI members to avenge IP attacks</li> </ul>
Presence and operational capability	↔	<p>AQI operating in Haditha, Ramadi and Fallujah, al Qaim, Rutbah</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AQI presence in Ramadi significantly increased in last two months</li> <li>AQI members utilize boats to easily travel through Euphrates Valley</li> <li>AQI increases infrastructure attacks in Anbar</li> </ul>
Cooperation with other groups	↑	<p>Insurgent and other T&amp;FF groups cooperate with AQI on tactical level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AQI and AS cooperate in Haditha/Haqlaniyah, Bani Dahir, Zuwayyah</li> <li>Insurgent groups associated with AQI join to defend Fallujah against Shia militias</li> <li>Open source, unnamed insurgent groups claims purging Anbar of AQI</li> </ul>



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## Al Anbar Province: Indicators -- Infrastructure and Networks


Activity	Trend	Recent Reporting
Financial networks	↔	<p>Networks attempting reconstitution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Ramadi-based AQI facilitators identified</li> <li>▪ AQI extorting funding from local businesses</li> </ul>
Suicide bomber facilitation	↔	<p>Networks adjusting after Coalition disruptions in WERV</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ AQI continues to smuggle FFs from Syria through Ramadi area</li> <li>▪ Shaykh Sayf FFs located east of Fallujah</li> </ul>
Materiel supply networks	↔	<p>Smuggling activities continue despite Coalition operations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Haditha AQI cells function as weapons suppliers and financiers, provide forged documentation</li> <li>▪ AQI members control majority of fuel oil distribution in Ramadi</li> </ul>
Media networks	↑	<p>AQI use of al Anbar for propaganda, media networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 10 possible Muj Shura Council members located in Ramadi</li> <li>▪ MSC claimed numerous anti-Coalition attacks in Fallujah, Ramadi</li> </ul>
Sanctuaries	↔	<p>AQI in Rutbah, Al Qaim, Ramadi, Haditha, Fallujah, Husaybah</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ AQI members congregate in Albu Thiyab and Albu Ali Jassim tribal lands, Jarayshi Market area and Thalathin Tamuiz district of Ramadi</li> <li>▪ FF housed on the south bank of the Euphrates in the vicinity of Maskuka, a subdivision of Dulab</li> <li>▪ FF living in former govt housing complex in Saqlawiyah</li> </ul>



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# Al Anbar: Regional Atmospherics



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# **AL ANBAR CONSOLIDATION**

## **Governance and Economics**

Transitioning to Provincial Iraqi Control

Setting Conditions for Sustainable Economic Growth

RDML Scott Van Buskirk  
22 Mar 06

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# Current State of Play



- Al Anbar Meeting
  - General Casey, MoD, Mol, MoIM
  - Governor & Security Council Reps
  - Address Al Anbar Petition requests
    - Petition response drafted
    - Governor briefed 20 Mar
    - MoIM brief 23 Mar
    - Mol and MoD brief 26 Mar
  - Meet at Ramadi Government Center
    - Date TBD




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# Current State of Play



- Governor continuing engagement
  - Presided at 13 & 20 Mar PRDC
  - Focusing SOW effort
    - 40 SOW completed and submitted for contract advertisement ✓
  - Attending 23 Mar weekly MoIM meeting
  - Meeting Minister of Electricity / Minister of Trade
  - 6 Apr meeting with PM
- PRT preps continuing
  - Team Leader in Ramadi –  (b)(6)
    - Other team members being identified
  - 3<sup>rd</sup> CAG aligned to support
  - LGP training 24-26 Mar
  - LGP Ramadi workshop 28-31 Mar

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# Current State of Play



- Fallujah City Council Reengaged
  - Well attended City Council meetings
    - Fox News Crew filmed 21 Mar session
    - Iraqi News Print coverage
  - Sent message about Shia intimidation of Sunnis
- Challenges and issues
  - Ramadi communications switch
  - Health care clinics
    - CERP Funding
    - Security
  - Housing compensation
    - MoF suspension of Fallujah payments
    - Seeking additional \$125M
  - Need to now go after IG Reconstruction and

Development money



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# **MNC-I AL ANBAR CONSOLIDATION**

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## Governance Key Tasks Reconstruction

**Governance Goal:** Build a government (National to Local institutional structure) capable of leading its own reconstruction effort

### Near Term

- **MNC-I Initiative** – Technical Engineering Assistance (response to MNF-W RFA)
- **Intent** – Provide Iraqi Engineers to MNF-W to assist the Al Anbar PRDC with technical engineering expertise to conduct engineering assessments, develop scopes of work, and infrastructure development in the province
- **Status** – Funding (CERP) has been allocated and is available to use for Technical Engineering Assistance. Guidance on methods to contract/acquire technical expertise to include sample contracts has been provided.
- ✓ ▪ **MNC-I Initiative** – Determine conditions / requirements to resume construction of Ramadi Bridge
- **Intent** – Resolve security concerns to either restart work on this GOI DFI project or terminate and use remaining funds elsewhere while still available. Currently paying \$400K/month to contractor for CF mandated work stoppage.
- **Status** – Negotiations to re-mobilize the contractor have begun.
- **MNC-I Initiative** – Identify mechanisms to enhance local security for construction and economic zones
- **Intent** – Assist MNF-W to develop innovative means for provincial government to build / resource economic incubators to facilitate construction, trade, and finance.
- **Status** – Developing framework for Micro Finance Centers in Al Anbar



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## Economic Key Tasks

### Economic Goal: Stimulate Free Market Economy

#### Near Term

- **MNC-I Initiative** – Municipal Business Registry
- **Intent** – Assist MNF-W with technical expertise to support municipal registry of businesses and enterprises and the subsequent development/expansion of trade and business associations that facilitate and develop better business practices and stimulate trade and commerce.
- **Status** – MNC-I has engaged with USAID to refine effort. MNC-I engagement with MNF-I, DOS/USAID and technical ministries ICW MNF-W
  
- **MNC-I Initiative** –Municipal microfinance institutions (MFI) within an economic enterprise zone
- **Intent** – Assist MNF-W with technical expertise to develop microfinance centers and facilitate development of local economic enterprise zones.
- **Status** – MNC-I has engaged through USAID with NGO IZDIHAR to develop requirements for establishing multiple MFI in Al Anbar. Coordinating resources; way forward will be ICW MNF-W
  
- **MNC-I Initiative** – Codify property address naming conventions
- **Intent** – Identify naming conventions for addresses and properties that supports future land rights resolution, provision of public utilities and emergency services.
- **Status** – Initiated discussions between MNC-I and MNF-I to develop scope and identify responsible GOI Ministries

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# MNC-I IO Support to AA Consolidation

- **Mission:** Support AA Consolidation by influencing populace to support security and reconstruction objectives of the GOI. Create favorable environment for economic growth.

- **Intent:** Persuade the Target Audience to de-legitimize violence and increase support for self-governance and reconstruction efforts. Enhance capability and professionalism of the ISF.

*Derry Anderson*

## Objectives

- Sunnis in Al Anbar unite to defeat terrorism
- Sunni Tribal and Local Leaders free from intimidation
- Al Anbar Reconstruction is unhindered

## Phased Plan (Draft)

- Target Audience: MAMs, Sunni tribe vs. AQI
- Brand introduction via TV, Posters, and Billboards
- Phased Arguments: Terror out, Security In, Employment, Prosperity, and CF draw down
- Highlight Al Anbar Development: Businesses, Business Plans, Investments

**END STATE:** Populace of Al Anbar and its leaders are dedicated to the Security, Peace, Prosperity and Unity of the region and supportive of the GOI



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# ***IOTF Support to AA Consolidation***

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## **Desired Effect**

- Wedge between AQI and Al Anbar populace is expanded

## **Key Tasks**

- Encourage Al Anbar Populace to unite and kick AQI out
- Highlight AQI attacks on tribal, governmental, and religious leaders
- Highlight AQI attacks on Sunni Mosques and Al Anbar infrastructure

## **What We Have Done**

- Refocused current media onto Al Anbar
- Increased radio production highlighting AQ attacks on Sunnis
- Produced video of Sunni Imams and Al Anbar Sheiks denouncing violence and calling for unity against terrorism
- Producing TVC on San Raphael thumb drives
- "Criminals 2" TV commercial focused on HVIs in Ramadi
- Adjusted Surveys/Polls to focus in Al Anbar

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## MNF-W Comments



- stagnating in  
Dorade  
- Holding WCV  
- Weariness

Had the neutral



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# ***Al Anbar Operations MNSTC-I***

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# Al Anbar IPS District Generation

TOTAL=11,330

8000 Recruits Required; 900 per Month

Districts	Current	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Fallujah Auth: Man/Train/Equip: 1,700 Base 17	1700	2	2		2						
Ramadi Auth: Man/Train/Equip: 4,018 Base 16	934			2	2		75%				
Al Qa'im Auth: Man/Train/Equip: 2,072 Base 10	435				4	50%	75%				
Hit Auth: Man/Train/Equip: 90 Base 10	79				2				50%		
Haditha Auth: Man/Train/Equip: 685 Base 6	0				3	50%		75%			
Rutbah Auth: Man/Train/Equip: 300 Base 4	0							3	75%		
Anah Auth: Man/Train/Equip: 200 Base 1	0									50%	
Rawah Auth: Man/Train/Equip: 200 Base 1	35									50%	
Habbaniyah Auth: Man/Train/Equip: 350 Base 3	0	2				50%			75%		

% Man/Train/Equip 100% Man/Train/Equip # Station Complete 100% Construct Complete



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## ***IPS Provincial Status – Al Anbar***

- MOI approved new hire of 300 Officer and 3000 Enlisted
- Provincial Council has appointed (b)(6) as PDoP
- 1,483 vetted candidates currently in training:
  - Ramadi – 934, Al Qaim – 435, Hit – 79 Rawah – 35
  - MOI conducts background investigation and issues hiring order
- Identified 713 Existing / Serving IP during MEF assessment
  - Hit – 510, Habbaniyah – 203
- 600 screened for BPC beginning 26 Mar 06
- Husaybah prepared to receive 200 IP to graduate 23 Mar 06

INTEGRATION  
PLAN

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


## ***IPS Provincial Way Ahead – Al Anbar***



- Support new Provincial DoP via PTTs
- MOI approval of new hires necessary to reach 11,330 authorized
  - Vet and train 3,300 new hires recently approved
- Continue to identify existing IP and vet / train
- Ensure equip available as IP return from training
- MOI recruited/vetted 600 to BPC 26 Mar 06—CF will assist in Movement
- MOI recruiting goal is 700 to JIPTC 15 Apr 06








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# Al Qa'im POE Way Ahead



## Way Ahead


- POE working group – MNF-W / CPATT / MOI – meet to develop detail POE timeline
- Set Conditions
  - Jun 06 – border forts complete / DBE effective in controlling the border
  - Sep 06 – develop POEs Trebil and Waleed to standard
  - Dec 06 – Al Qa'im IPS force generation complete
  - Feb 07 – 3/7 IA effective in supporting COIN operations – level 2
- Funding must be identified – approximately 8 M for POE and 4 M for road construction

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# IRAQI ARMY




## Goals

- Ensure security for Al Anbar citizens
- Increase 1st IA Division & 7th IA Division strength
- Increase Sunni participation in the Iraq Army through filling existing personnel shortages

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2006

2007



• Al Anbar to provide a total of 5000 recruits for the Iraqi Army

- 5 training cycles
- 1000 men per training cycle

• Recruit in Al Qaim, Ramadi and Fallujah

• Train at Habbaniyah Regional Training Center

• Initial emphasis is on 1st and 7th IA Divisions

- 1st IA Division: 1118
- 7th IA Division: 2215

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# TF OP DAHIR Update


1.4a

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
# JTF 1.4a: OP DAHIR Operations since 08 MAR 06





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
# AQIZ Fusion Cell Disposition and Composition





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## State of AQIZ



- AMZ still in control of AQIZ; adjusted his tactics and methods, but not his goals
- Mujahidin Shura Council in Iraq (MSC) remains effective and continues to gain influence
- Baghdad leadership remains central to AQIZ; serves as conduit to AMZ
- Facilitation networks remain active; various routes for fighters, funds and other support
- Movement of 'Atiyah has strategic implications; provides targeting opportunities

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# CG's Comments

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